Financial futures for banks by Barbara Bennett
When interest rates were fairly stable and
the yield curve was thoughtto be well-
behaved, bankers generally regarded a
Interestrate risk is the riskthat fluctuations in
interestrates might cause the value ofa
bank'snetworthtofall. Because achange in
the level of interest rates will affectthe
present value ofshorter,term instruments
less than the present value of longer-term
instruments, banks place their shareholder's
equity at risk by mismatching. For example,
a bank with an excess of long-term assets
relative to long-term liabilities would exper-
ience a decline in its value if interest rates
were to rise because, other things equal, the
value of its assets wouId fall by more than
the value of its liabilities. (Ofcourse, such
adecline in value is not likelyto appear
immediatelyas adeclineinrecorded capital
since banks record assets and liabilities at
book value. However, itwill show up as a
decline inthe spread between abank'syield
on assets and its cost offunds. Such adeteri-
oration in a bank's earnings potential is
likely to bereflected in a lower market price
for its shares.)
to achieve a betteroverall match between
the maturities (technically, the repricing
periods) oftheir assets and liabilities. By
making greater use offloating rate business
and mortgage loan contracts, among other
things, banks have been able to shorten the
repricing period, or the length oftime
between interest rate adjustments, on their
assets withoutnecessarilychangingthecon-
tractual maturityofthose assets. Nonethe-
less, these efforts frequently do notyield a
perfectmatch between the repricingperiods
ofassets and liabilities. Thus, theremay be
instances in which some ofa bank's assets
have a shorter effective maturity than thatof
the liabilities fundingthose assets as well as
viceversa. To theextentthatamismatch still
exists, then a bank has assumed interest rate
risk.
This growing interest in financial futures is
one manifestation ofa more general con-
cern about managing banks' exposure to
interest rate risk. High and volatile interest
rates ofthe pastfewyears havemade interest
rate risk management an importantdetermi-
nantofa bank's profitability and even of its
soundness over the longer run. As a result,
bankers have sought to improve their ability
both to measure their bank's exposure to
interest rate risk and to manage such risk.
This Letter examines the nature ofinterest
rate risk in the banking industry as well as
financial futures' potential for hedging that
risk. Nextweek's Letter will look at some
ofthe regulatory and accounting problems
that arise in connection with banks' use of
financial futures.
This may notalways be the case now, how-
ever. In recent years, banks have attempted
Interest rate risk
Banks have always been in the business of
assuming interest rate risk along with the
credit,or default, risks they assume in
making loans. Historically, banks have per-
formed a "maturity intermediation" func-
tion byborrowingshortand lending long. In
other words, bank assets on average have
traditionallyhad a longermaturitythan bank
liabilities.
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A topic generating a great deal ofinterest
in banking circles these days is financial
futures. Trade publications are turningout
articles on this subject by the dozens, while
seminars on hedging with financial futures
are drawing hundreds ofbankers. Everyone
in the industry, itseems, is becoming aware
ofthe potential benefits ofusing financial
futures to manage interest rate risk and
reduce earnings volatility. And although the
numberofbanks participating in the finan-
cial futures markets is currently small,
interest in using futures is becoming wide-
spread within the industry.IF~cdl~1f@lll ~~(§)~1fW~
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necessarily reflect the views of the management
of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
or of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
strategy ofactively mismatching the matur-
itiesofassets and IiabiIities as profitable. The
risk of aserious deterioration in the value of
bank shareholders' equity was perceived-
perhaps incorrectly-as minimal. However,
the accelerating inflation ofthe 1970s
increased the variability of interest rates and
madethe shape ofthe yield curve less pre-
dictable. As a resu It, bankers became
increasingly conscious ofthe impactthe
asset/liability mix oftheir bank's balance
sheet had on earnings and share values, and
they began to pay more attention to control-
lingexposure to interest rate risk.
Hedging with futures
Hedging with financial futures is one low-
cost means ofreducingexposure to interest
rate risk that has attracted a lotofattention
recently. Financial futures are contracts that
are traded on organized exchanges obligat-
ingthe buyer (seller) to take (make) delivery
ofa given financial instrument at a specified
future date and price. All transactions in
financial futures are cleared through the
exchange clearinghouse, which acts as the
opposite party to every transaction. Thus, a
position in financial futures can be readily
"closed out" without taking (or making)
deliveryofthe specified securities simplyby
taking the opposite position with the clear-
inghouse beforethe contractdelIvery date.
Positions in financial futures are held with
small "good faith" margins and gains or
losses from that position are posted to the
margin account accordingto daily price
movements.
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Although contracts are available for a
varietyoffinancial instruments, bankers find
the 90-day Treasury bill, the 90-dayCD and
the GNMA passthrough certificate contracts
to be the most useful in hedging interest rate
risk. Because the prices ofthese contracts
generallymovewith changes in the pricesof
the underlying instrument, a position in
futures can be used to offset a bank's spot
position, thus leaving earnings largely
unaffected by movements in market interest
rates. Thus a bank that had an excess of
long-term assets over liabilities could hedge
against rising rates (i.e., falling security
prices) by selling futures-that is, contract-
ingto make delivery in the future. Should
interest rates in fact rise, the decline in
the value ofthe bank's assets relative to the
valueofits liabilities is likelyto be offset by
the rise in the value ofthe bank's futures
position.
For example, suppose a bank on last May 6
funded a $10 million six-rnonth bullet loan
(principal and all interest due at maturity)
with 90-day CDs and wanted to preserve a
300 basis point spread on the difference
between the goingCD rate of8.31 percent
and the loan rate of 11 .31 percent. The bank
was open to the risk that when the 90-day
CDs matured on August 4 and had to be
rolled overforanother90days atanewrate,
theCD rate could have risen, thus reducing
its earnings spread overthe six-month life of
the loan. To protect itself against this risk,
the bank could have sold ten CD futures
contracts (which qre traded in $1 million
lots) onMay6fordelivery in September, the
contractdeliverydatec1osestto the roll-over
dateof its CDs. Using data on the actual
closing priceofthe SeptemberCD futures
contractthat was quoted in the Wall Street
Journal on May6, 1983, the bank would
have acquired its short position at the going
price of91.43, or adiscount rate of8.57
percent. It would then have closed out its
position on August 4 when it issued the new
CDs. According the the Wall Street Journal,
the closing priceofthe September CD con-
tract on August 6 was 89.84 for adiscountrate of 10.16 percent. The bank's profiton
this transaction, then, would have been 159
basis points because, as interest rates rose
and securities prices fell, the bank could, in
essence, have met the terms of its original
contracttodeliverCDs atapriceof91.43 by
purchasing those securities at 89.94, and
then selling them at the higher price. Thus,
while the CD rate had risen from 8.31 to
9.88 percent overthat time, the bank would
havestill earned aspread of301 basis points
overthe six-month term ofthe loan. Un-
hedged, the bank'sspread wouId haveaver-
aged only 221 basis points.
Hedgingwith financial futures can beavery
effective means ofpreserving a bank's earn-
ings. Ofcourse, notall futures hedges are
likely to preserve a bank's spread so effec-
tively. The effectiveness ofthe hedge wiII
depend on thestabilityofthe "basis,"orthe
difference between the rate on the under-
lying instrument and the rate on the futures
contract. In the example above, futures
prices moved closely with changes in spot
prices, but this is sometimes not the case.
Nonetheless, financial futures have a num-
berofadvantages oversome ofthe other
alternatives open to banks for reducing
interest rate risk primarily because trans-
actions in futures are relatively costless to
effect. The other alternatives available to
banks-matching the repricing periods of
assets and liabilities by offeringonly short-
term or variable rate loans orselling
unmatched assets (typically, mortgages)
to outside investors-bycontrast, may
entail higher costs.
Thus, one advantage ofhedging with finan-
cial futures is that unliketransactions which
involve matching repricing periods ofassets
and liabilities, transactions in financial
futures do notrequire costly credit evalua-
tions either on the part ofthe bank or on the
part ofpotential investors. Since the oppo-
site partytoeverytransacton in futures is the
exchange clearinghouse, the risk ofdefauIt
to both the bank and the investor is diversi-
fied and is therefore much lowerthan if
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those two parties were to deal directlywith
each other.
Moreover, hedgingwith financial futures
may be more attractive than achieving the
same level ofrisk exposure in the spot
market because the cost ofcarry is lower.
Futures positions can be held with small
margins ($2,000 can typically control a $1
million CD futures contract) and payment
forthe entire market value ofthe contract is
not required unless the position is leftopen
until the contractdelivery date. Spot market
transactions, bycontrast, involveimmediate
delivery and must be paid for with cash or
financed.
Growing interest
Given the advantages offinancial futures, it
is no wonderthat many bankers are investi-
gating their use in hedging interest rate risk,
even though to date, only a hundred or so
banks (out ofmore than 14,000) have
actually used them. Some ofthe reluctance
touse futures has todowith a lackoftrained
personnel as well as a realization thatwhile
futures helpto protect against downside
risks, they also limitbanks' ability to take
advantage ofbeneficial movements in inter-
est rates. The rather limited use offutures to
date may also be due to the regulatory and
accounting problems that arise in connec-
tion with the use of futures. These latter
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(Dollaramounts in millions)











Loans"(gross, adjusted) and investments'" 163.936 586 1.699 1.0
Loans (gross, adjusted) ......:.total# 143,912 639 2,171 1.5
Commercial and industrial 44.312 517 - 1.019 - 2.2
Real estate 57,414 24 180 0.3
loansto individuals 24,971 0 1,569 6.7
Securities loans 2,974 - 66 762 - 34.4
U.s. Treasury securities'" 7,543 - 49 903 13.6
Other securities'" 12,479 - 4 - 1,375 - 9.9
Demand deposits - total# 41,471 -1,720 690 1.7
Demanddeposits - adjusted 30,290 1,134 1,373 4.7
Savings deposits - totalt 66,257 25 33,600 102.9
Time deposits - total# 69,123 452 - 30.911 - 30.9
Individuals; part. & corp, 63,551 410 - 26,264 - 29.2
(Large negotiable CD's) 16,856 - 34 - 19,811 - 54.0
Weekly Averages
ofDaily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves {+l/Deficiency(-1
Borrowings
















'" Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
t Includes Money Market Deposit Accounts, Super-NOW accounts, and NOW accounts.
Editorial comments may beaddressed totheeditor (Gregory Tong)ortotheauthor ....Freecopiesof
this and other Federal Reserve publications can beobtained by calling or writing the Public
Information Section, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120.
Phone (415) 974-2246.